In Locke’s "An Essay Concerning Human Understanding", Book II, Chapter xxvii, "Of Identity and Diversity,” he discusses the structure of identity. He wants to define the material that makes human beings have a personality or sense of self. He asks the reader to first distinguish what the difference is between a “human” and a “person.” He then asks us to further distinguish between what it is to be a person and what it is to be the same person. In this essay I will discuss the meaning of Locke’s concept of personal identity, focusing on the definition of Locke’s key point: consciousness. I will show that Locke’s theory of personal identity relies too heavily on memory as a foundation.
In Section 9 Locke introduces his theory by saying, “…we must consider what ‘person’ stands for. I think it is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing at different times and places.” He argues this point in order to define a person as something more than a biological organism. This leads him to his next point that those persons who are able to think are simultaneously aware that they are thinking. This is described hereafter as one’s consciousness.
What makes his theory one of “personal identity” is that Locke believes as long as the consciousness is the same, the body or structure is irrelevant, “…personal identity consists not in the identity of substance but in the identity of consciousness,” (Section 19) He makes reference to his little finger, saying that it is ruled by his consciousness but is separate from it. It could be amputated and he would still be the same person intrinsically, meaning, his consciousness would still function as it had before. “…consciousness unites actions—whether from long ago or from the immediately preceding moment—into the same person. Whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they both belong,” (Section 16).
But what is this consciousness? This thing that Locke believes describes the very essence of humanity? At the beginning of Section 17 he says, “Self is that conscious thinking thing that feels or is conscious of pleasure and pain and capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself as far as that consciousness extends.” He treats the conscious as the personality, though they are not necessarily unique. With Locke’s theory two humans could technically be the same person if they have the same consciousness, or the same memories and experiences.
Locke’s idea of consciousness rests heavily on memories and that could be problematic for people suffering memory loss. Amnesia can occur by either wiping out the patients past memories entirely, or by removing particular memories. Locke argues that they are not the same. And he has a point: Wouldn’t you treat your best friend slightly differently if he couldn’t remember you? You probably wouldn’t be as likely to call him up. But I am not convinced that this person’s lack of memory makes him a completely different person. I believe his personality stays intact. He still has the same predisposition that he had when he was born.
Another problem I see with Locke’s theory is that of false memories. A lot of times my parents will tell stories to my sibling and I about our early childhood and get memories confused. All my life I thought I was the kid who threw up on the Tilt-A-Whirl but my grandmother confirmed recently that it was actually my sister. For many years I thought I remembered that incident at the San Diego County Fair: the horrified look of the teenager operating the ride; the embarrassed stare of an older woman with a fanny pack. The memory was all false. Does that make me the same person as my sister? We share a lot of experiences, and are often unsure whose memories are whose. Locke would argue that in the time that we had the same memories we were also sharing the same consciousness. He claims the structures of our physical forms do not need to be the same. She is 6 years younger than I am, however, so her memory would be skewed by the types of thoughts one has at 6 and mine would be shaped by the thoughts of a 12 year old.
Locke makes a good argument for consciousness as the framework of personal identity but I don’t believe he makes personal identity unique enough. I don’t believe that two different human organisms could ever be the same person. I believe in the interconnectedness of nature only so far as each individual person is shaped by every experience they’ve had, and also the experiences of their relatives (through the stories they tell, and the examples they set), and the experience of their human form. One might still be the same person without his little finger, but he would be changed internally by that loss just as your person is changed by any event. Consciousness is more fluid than Locke argues, more unpredictable and changing, and therefore much more exclusive.
In Section 9 Locke introduces his theory by saying, “…we must consider what ‘person’ stands for. I think it is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing at different times and places.” He argues this point in order to define a person as something more than a biological organism. This leads him to his next point that those persons who are able to think are simultaneously aware that they are thinking. This is described hereafter as one’s consciousness.
What makes his theory one of “personal identity” is that Locke believes as long as the consciousness is the same, the body or structure is irrelevant, “…personal identity consists not in the identity of substance but in the identity of consciousness,” (Section 19) He makes reference to his little finger, saying that it is ruled by his consciousness but is separate from it. It could be amputated and he would still be the same person intrinsically, meaning, his consciousness would still function as it had before. “…consciousness unites actions—whether from long ago or from the immediately preceding moment—into the same person. Whatever has the consciousness of present and past actions is the same person to whom they both belong,” (Section 16).
But what is this consciousness? This thing that Locke believes describes the very essence of humanity? At the beginning of Section 17 he says, “Self is that conscious thinking thing that feels or is conscious of pleasure and pain and capable of happiness or misery, and so is concerned for itself as far as that consciousness extends.” He treats the conscious as the personality, though they are not necessarily unique. With Locke’s theory two humans could technically be the same person if they have the same consciousness, or the same memories and experiences.
Locke’s idea of consciousness rests heavily on memories and that could be problematic for people suffering memory loss. Amnesia can occur by either wiping out the patients past memories entirely, or by removing particular memories. Locke argues that they are not the same. And he has a point: Wouldn’t you treat your best friend slightly differently if he couldn’t remember you? You probably wouldn’t be as likely to call him up. But I am not convinced that this person’s lack of memory makes him a completely different person. I believe his personality stays intact. He still has the same predisposition that he had when he was born.
Another problem I see with Locke’s theory is that of false memories. A lot of times my parents will tell stories to my sibling and I about our early childhood and get memories confused. All my life I thought I was the kid who threw up on the Tilt-A-Whirl but my grandmother confirmed recently that it was actually my sister. For many years I thought I remembered that incident at the San Diego County Fair: the horrified look of the teenager operating the ride; the embarrassed stare of an older woman with a fanny pack. The memory was all false. Does that make me the same person as my sister? We share a lot of experiences, and are often unsure whose memories are whose. Locke would argue that in the time that we had the same memories we were also sharing the same consciousness. He claims the structures of our physical forms do not need to be the same. She is 6 years younger than I am, however, so her memory would be skewed by the types of thoughts one has at 6 and mine would be shaped by the thoughts of a 12 year old.
Locke makes a good argument for consciousness as the framework of personal identity but I don’t believe he makes personal identity unique enough. I don’t believe that two different human organisms could ever be the same person. I believe in the interconnectedness of nature only so far as each individual person is shaped by every experience they’ve had, and also the experiences of their relatives (through the stories they tell, and the examples they set), and the experience of their human form. One might still be the same person without his little finger, but he would be changed internally by that loss just as your person is changed by any event. Consciousness is more fluid than Locke argues, more unpredictable and changing, and therefore much more exclusive.
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